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I. INTRODUCTION

Among the results of the extraordinary development of public environmental
consciousness has been major pressure for industry to alter production patterns.
From one perspective, especially in the short-run, the firm finds itself, as it tries
to adjust to standards ever more strict, confronted with greater costs associated

with this revolution. However, from another perspective, perhaps the long range
view for some companies, the new pressures, and the firm's own self-generated
motivation to protect the environment, can lead to a new type of business

strategy. That strategy, which has been colloquially called "green management,"
has been associated with positive impacts not only for the environment but for
several other variables. Among these variables are: an improved quality of
product, a greater commitment on the part of personnel to activities of the finn,

improved relations with the local community and with various interest groups,
better interactions with the media, lower insurance policy costs, better relations

1. See Jayne W. Barnard, Exaon Collides with the Valdez Principles,74 Bus. &SOc'Y REV. 32,32-35
(1990) (defining green management); K. Dechant et al., Environmental Leadership: From Compliance to
Competitive Advantage, 8 ACAD. OF MomT. 7 (1994); R. Clarke et al., The Challengeof Going Green, 72
HARV. Bus. REv. 37 (1994); Charles C. Corbett & Luk N. Van Wassenhove, How Green is Your

Manufacturing Strategy? Exploring the Impact of Environmental Issues on Manufacturing Strategy, 91
INSEAO WORKING PAPERS (1991); The British StandardsInstitution'sStandardand other definitions cited
in McCloskey, EnvironmentalManagement: Its Role in CorporateStrategy, 32 MGMr. DECISION 27 (1994);
Johnston, Flying Industry'sGreen Standard,138 NEw SCL 21 (1993). See also K. FISCHER, ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY (J. Shot ed., 1993); WALDEMAR HOPFENHECK, THE GREEN MANAGEMENT
REvoLUTION: LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL EXCELLENCE (1993); John C. Newman & Kay M. Breeden,
Managing in the EnvironmentalEra-Lessonsfrom EnvironmentalLeaders, 27 COLUM. J. OF WORLD BUS.
210 (1992); Vandermerwe & Oiff, Customers DriveCorporationsGreen, 23 LONG RANGE PLANNING 10 (Doc.
1990); Taylor, Green Management: The Next Competitive Weapon, 24 FUTURES 669 (1992); ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING (Michael J. Polonsky & Alma T. Mintu-Wimsatt eds., 1995); ENRICO SASSOON & CHRISTINA
RAPISARDA SASSOON, MANAGEMENT DEL'AMBIENTE: LA NUOVA PRIORITA STRATEGICA PER Gu ANNI
NOVANTA (1993); THOMAS F.P. SULLIVAN, THE GREENING OF AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992); BRUCE W.
PLASECKI, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY: THE AVALANCHE OF CHANGE SINCE BHOPAL (1995);
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND THETIERD WORLD (C. S. Pearson ed., 1987).
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with financial institutions, reduced exposure to several types of business risks,
overall reduction of costs, competitive advantages domestically, competitive

advantages in world markets, and improved relationships with regulatory agencies
or, more generally, with government or the public sector.2

This article analyzes this last hypothesized outcome: improved relations with
regulatory bodies and, more generally, implications for the regulatory process of
industry movement toward a more aggressive environmental protection strategy.3
Specifically this article will address: characteristics of information used in regulations, standard setting and its relationship to competition in a regulated sector,

legal liability, and the firm's overall relationship with the regulating entity
[hereinafter "the government" or "the regulator"]. This article further inquires

whether green management is a strategy that may allow industry to achieve
greater control--or at least some greater influence over-the regulatory process.
The authors conclude that while the evidence is mixed, it is also mounting that
companies which assume a corporate environmental business strategy will encounter more positive relations with regulators, both those in nation states and

international organizations. The authors show how the active firm can more
effectively participate in setting environmental rules and norms, how it can
achieve a competitive advantage, including internationally by influencing regulations and rules, and how it can reduce its liability exposure. This article also

addresses the relationship of green management to the ultimate object of concern:
environmental quality.

2.
See generally Utrich Steger, Corporations Capitalizeon Environmentalism, 17 BUS. & SOC'Y REV.
72 (1990); Bloom & Martin, Hazardous Waste is Every Manager's Problem, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer
1991, at 75; James Gustav Speth, EPA Must Help Lead an EnvironmentalRevolution in Technology, 21
ENVTL. L. 1425 (1991); Art Kleiner, What Does It Mean to be Green, HARV. Bus. REv. 38 (1991); J. Ladd
Greeno & s. Noble Robinson, Rethinking CorporateEnvironmentalManagement, 27 COLUM. J. OF WORLD
BUs. 223 (1992); Newman & Breeden, supranote 1; Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Towards a New
Conception of the Environment-CompetitivenessRelationship, (mimeograph, April 20, 1994) [hereinafter
Porter& Van derLinde]; Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, SCL AM., Apr. 1991, at 168. See also
Francesco Bertolini, Quando II JeansDiventa Green, L'IMPRESsAAMBI'ENTa 1994, at 40 (discussing Italy);
Francesco Bertolini, Industria e Regolatori Pubblicia Confronto Con La Sfida Amblentale Nell'Esperienza
Degli Stati Uniti 2 EcoNOmm E Drro DELThezimo 655 (1994).
3.
Our examples are American, Asian and European. See infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text
on the U.S. System. In the European Community see the firm's interactions with regulators around
environmental impact assessment and norm setting within the members states. See also Hans Jarass & Joseph
F. DiMento, Through ComparativeLawyers' Goggles:A PrimeronGennanEnvironmentalLaw, 6 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 47 (1993) (regarding Germany's executive regulations and administrative rules for the Federal
Emissions Protection Act and the Waste Act); E. CROCI, Er AL., AGENZIE E GOVERNO DELL'AIBXENTE: IL
CASO ITAUANO A CONFRONTO CON LE ESPERXENZE EsmE (1994) (comparing the regulatory systems in
European Community, Italy, France and Germany).
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II. GREEN MANAGEMENT DEFINED

Herein this article leaves open-ended the definition of green management.
The term has been used broadly and differently in the literature. Among the
constituent parts: (1) a commitment to research and development to create
innovative technologies and processes-either for use in the firm's own production or as a product for sale; (2) innovations aimed at reducing environmental
impacts in the firm's relationships with its dependents and subsidiaries; and (3)
development of products which are environmentally friendly (i.e., have fewer
negative environmental impacts than other products in the same market).
One encompassing understanding is that green management is the set of
activities which moves the firm to act independently of existing standards for
environmental protection and to act to decrease negative impacts or increase
positive impacts of its actions on the environment, even when regulatory standards will be surpassed. 4 Some associate green management'with companies that
identify a clean system of production linked to a policy of pollution prevention,
companies that treat as equally important economic and ecological objectives, and
companies which seek to reduce wastes and maximize use of natural resources
whether those be acquired resources or those held in common (such as the air and
water). 5
Part of the difficulty in definition derives from uncertainty as to what exactly
constitutes sound behavior from an ecological perspective. For example, Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), presently the target of an international phase-out, until
recently were considered safe products. Now many nations have committed to
eliminate most uses of CFCs (and other ozone depleting substances) by the year
2000 under the amended Montreal Protocol6 or earlier under domestic or other
international law!
Even what qualifies as a "green product" is a point of some controversy.
Canada's giant grocery chain Loblaws used one definition in the launching of its
new line: the new product must be equal in every respect to the products already
in commerce except with regard to its impact on the environment. A much more
elaborate approach is employed by the Swedish automaker Volvo using its "EPA"
system. This employs a number of indices: the reduction of natural resources, and
the extraction of primary resources, the use of land, emissions into air, water and

4. See McCloskey, supra note I.
5.
See HOPIEN E K, supranote 1.
6. MontrealProtocolon Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer, 1987 INT'L LEG;AL MATERIALS
261591C.
7.
TuE 1985 VIENNA CONVENTION ONTHE PROTECTON OFTHE OZONE LAYER, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVmONMENrTAL LAw-VOLUMES 1-111 (Harold Hohman, ed., 1992).
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the soil. The result of this system is an environmental load unity, which allows
comparisons of different choices of materials
III. THE REGULATORY PROCESS: THE U.S. EXAMPLE
The regulatory process in the United States is highly and increasingly
complex, despite periodic attempts at reform and simplification. Complexity
results, in part, from the several levels of regulation to which industry is subjected: the federal, state, regional and local-and in an embryonic, yet dramatic
way, the international. 9
The firm may be regulated through adjudication, informal decision making
or, most comprehensively for our purposes, rulemaking. Adjudication is the
quasi-judicial activity of an administrative agency wherein an order, injunction
or declaration is made which specifically affects the disputing parties. For
example, through adjudication a license is granted to or revoked from a company.
Informal decisions are innumerable and refer to those daily government actions
of direction and advice which take place absent a formal record or evidentiary
hearing; these decisions relate to the activities of the firm as a single entity but do

not aim to influence a whole sector.' 0 Rulemaking is aimed at making law that has

generalapplicationandfuture effect for an industry. It is sometimes referred to
as quasi-legislative activity."

8. See Rotherberg & Maxwell, VOLVO: A Case in the Implementation of ProactiveEnvironmental
Management, in TIEMGREENINGOFINDUSTRY, Boston, Massachusetts (1993). Other approaches to classifying
a green product are more complex and include quantification of a number of variables including the waste
produced per metric ton of finished product and the percentage of recycled materials used in packaging. See
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International, IISD, Coming Clean, SUSTNABmLTrY, London, 1993, at 61.
Nonetheless, definitions are sufficiently standard for interested groups to be able to quantify the generation of
new green products. For example, the Marketing Intelligence Service Ltd. counted the introduction of green
products that had been made across countries it studied. Its tally is presented in Appendix 1.
9. For example, in California the area of air quality regulation emanates from: (1) the federal government, primarily via the Environmental Protection Agency's implementation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-767(q) (1995); (2) the State government, via the Air Resources Board implementation of federal air
law and state air legislation, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 24378-24398, §§ 39000 et seq., and §§ 4430044394 (West 1995); (3) regional government, via air quality management districts which implement both state
and federal law under rules which they adopt to meet air quality standards; (4) county government which
exercises separate authorities to control some kinds of air pollution; (5) cities which have separate authorities
consistent with or as required by authorities at other levels of government; and (6) international or global
agreements like the Montreal Protocol, an international treaty regulating ozone depleting chemicals including
CFCs through a near term production freeze, a phased reduction of production, and a trade ban.
10. For example, a company may be advised about its activities providing concessionaire services in
a national park or an informal opinion may be offered by an agency employee about the acceptability of a
technology for emission reductions. See Warner M. Gardner, The InformalActions of the FederalGovernment,
26 AM. U. L. REV. 799 (1977).
II. Some brief examples include: (1) setting a standard under the Clean Air Act for hazardous air
pollutants; (2) specifying general categories of best available technology under a pollution control statute; (3)
determining what materials may be utilized in recyclable products sold to the federal government; (4)
determining the characteristics of a market based program for cleaning the air of a region ofthe country. Cf.
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In implementing legislative directives in the environmental arena, as in all

U.S. regulatory arenas, the federal government (and to one degree or another state
governments) 2 undertakes a standard process outlined below using the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an example.

The agency legislatively authorized to make law implementing a statute
gathers information internally on the subjects about which it will promulgate
rules.13 For example, for law on air quality control: (1) the policy analysis and
review branch of an agency undertakes literature searches, sponsors research, and

carries out its own analyses of market-based strategies for realizing air quality
objectives; (2) an environmental engineering and technology branch of the agency

gathers information on theleading technologies used in the automobile emissions
control industry.
The agency next publishes a proposed regulation in the FederalRegister, a
government publication which serves to inform the regulated industry and the
public of a contemplated government regulatory activity. For example, the EPA
proposes under the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act an emissions trading
program and proposes parameters of the permits for it, the rules for trading, and
the markets in which the permits will be traded. The agency also proposes to

define the best available control technology by reference to several characteristics. t4
A Notice and Comment Period follows during which the agency invites and
reviews information supplied by interested parties. Industry groups, environmental interest groups, private citizens, other government agencies, and others

CROci Er AL., supra note 3 (comparing perspectives with Italy, France, Germany and the European
Community).
12. State processes in the United States vary. In general terms they are similar to the federal model
which follows in the text. For an example of California's process, see California Administrative Procedure Act,
tit. 2, div. 3, part I, ch. 3.5, CAL. GOV'TC6DE, § 11340 (West 1995). At the regional and local levels the
process may be based more fully on public hearings, although some regional agencies will formally solicit
comments from any interested parties. At the municipal (city and county) level, proposed ordinances may
address the same general subject matter as regulations from other levels of government. Again, municipal
processes differ but usually include mandated notice of proposed regulatory actions and public hearings. See
SAN JOSE MUN. CODE, Ch. 18.12, Precise Plans, part 2, Procedure for Adoption or Amendment (1979).
Regulatory relations among these various levels of government are complex. This has serious implications for the regulated firm. For the purposes of this article, we simply summarize that in certain regulatory
fields the federal (or higher) level of government may preempt a field precluding the lower level of government
from making law which conflicts with the higher level law.
Preemption analysis itself is complex. For present purposes it means that where a legislature has adopted
a regulatory scheme, local legislative control over the subject as covered by the higher level government
regulation ceases. On the relationships between federal and state authorities in environmental law, see
generally ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER, ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY,
ch. 10 (1992); SHELDON M. NOVICK & BILL PEDERSON, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ch. 6 (S.
Novick ed.. 1993).
13. See NoviCK & PEDERSON, supranote 12 (examining the authorities, organization and procedures
of the United States Environmental Protection Agency).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 424 (1992).
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may supply views and opinions on the proposed rule. They do this by critiquing
the parameters or general concept of the rule or supporting its characteristics and
calling for the proposed rule's greater application. At this time interest groups can
inform the agency of their views on the proposed rule: is it basically sound? how
would the interest group change the rule? upon what information does the interest
group making comments base its position? Through this means, scientific information is generated and debated.' 5 For example, a company to be regulated by the
emissions trading program may submit an analysis arguing that the program does
not reflect an understanding of the industry's ability to monitor its own emissions.
Additionally, an environmental interest group may assert that the definition of
"best available control technology" does not reflect knowledge of leading
engineering in other jurisdictions.
The EPA then publishes the rule. After a legally specified period, the rule is
promulgated as law. This is referred to as a regulation or a rule which is added to
U.S. law in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Challenges to the rules may, and often do, occur in the courts. Several
possible theories are employed to seek the overturn of a proposed regulation,
including: (1) the agency failed to follow its own mandated procedures; (2) the
agency exceeded its authority as delegated to it by the legislature; and (3) the
its discretion in processing information supplied in the comment
agency abused
6

period.'

IV. THE REGULATORY PROCESS: TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECrIVE
Legal systems differ internationally as to elements which they provide dejure
or defacto in their processes for implementing and enforcing environmental law
and for creating norms, promulgating rules or setting standards. The terminology
in the regulatory process varies across nations and International Government
Organizations (IGOs). Nations fall along a Continuum depending on how
centralized the generation and collection of information used in developing rules
and the nature and amount of participation allowed interested parties. This
includes the affected firms commenting on, and participating in, making rules for
environmental protection.17 International legal systems differ on theories of

15.

This process may be more or less formal. In the more formal variety, submissions may be subject

to cross examination, oral arguments may be allowed, the right to submit evidence in rebuttal may be recognized, and other procedures which resemble an adversary hearing may be employed. See generally DONALD
D. BARRY &HowARD R.WHrrcoMa, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLiC AODmIrisrxoN (2d ed., 1987).
16. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1977).
17. See Ludwig Kitimer, The European Economic Communi, in TURNER T. SMtTH JR. & PASCALE
KROMAREK, UNDERSTANDING US AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A PRACI~rroNER's GUIDE (1987)

(giving examples from the European Community); Turner T. Smith & Roszell D. Hunter, The European
Community Environmental Legal System, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. (1992); Lawrence I. Sperling & Ira R. Feldman,
The Transboundary Movement ofHazardous Waste: Implementatdon and Enforcement of Control Regimes in
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liability which they apply in environmental law and on the amount of discretion
allowed in enforcement.' 8 Furthermore, they have different guiding principles on
specific activities of green marketing, ecolabeling (designating a product as
meeting governmental standards of being "environmentally friendly") and related

tactics of the green management and certification of best control technology. 9
France, for example, has a rulemaking system mainly lodged in centralized and
hierarchical administrative units which allow modest formal participatory roles
to non-government interests.n In the decentralized German system, the involvement of regulated parties comes at the point of promulgation of executive regulations and administrative rules. The process involves hearings and formal
participatory mechanisms which provide opportunity for citizen participation.2 '

Dutch environmental law is "very liberal 22 in allowing public participation in
government proceedings. The formal rulemaking procedures of U.S. administrative law may be most fully developed in the United States but most legal
systems have some significant degree of interaction between the firm and the
regulator. Each legal regime lodges a degree of discretion within administrative
units or processes as to treatment of the perspectives of regulated companies.
Those interactions and that discretion are influenced by the dynamics described

in this article. Companies which do business exclusively in their country of
incorporation and multinational firms which wish to affect the nature of the en-

vironmental control to which they are subjected, may be interested in the strategic
lessons which follow.

the European Community. 22 ENVTL. L REP. (1992); RONALD BRICKmAN, CONTROLLING CHEMIcALS: THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1985); G. MAJONE, DEREGULATION OR REREGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1990); Jarass & DiMento, supra

note 3; CROcI ET AL., supranote 3 (discussing the treatment of the European Agency of the Environment
established by CEE Rule n. 1210/90 on May 7, 1990). See also CRocIETAL.., supranote 3 (regarding France):
Christian Huglo, France,in SMrrH & KROMAREK supra (discussing France); Echard Rehbinder, The Federal
Republic of Germany. in SmriH & KRoMAREK, supra (examining Germany); S. SALMI Duirrro DELL'
AMIENMTL PRmNCIp FONDAMENTALIDIDIRTTODAMDINTALE (1994) (analyzing Italy); Richard Macrory, The
United Kingdom, in SMITH & KROMAREK, supra (discussing the United Kingdom); T. Schrecker, Resisting
EnvironmentalRegulation: The Cryptic Patternof Business.GovernmentRelations, in ROBERT PAEHLKE &
DOUGLAS TORGERSON, MANAGING LEVIATHAN (1990) (explaining Canada and Western Europe).
18. See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text (discussing liability of the firm). In some legal
systems the amount of prosecutorial discretion is severely circumscribed. Italy is an example. See generally
E. DoLNi ETAL, COMMENTAIO DELLE'"MoDiFCHEALsIsMEMA PENAIE" (1994); GpnIuo FoRn, COLPA ED
EVENTO NEL Dm=TrO PENALE (1990). See Martin Filhr, ProactiveInstruments in Business Management,2
ELNI NEwsL. 11 (1995);T.F.P. SuLuIVANTiE GREENIG OFAERICAN BUSINESS (1992) (citing Germany's
Blue Angel Program, Japan's Eco-Mark, and Canada's Environmental Choice). Independant organizations also
develop standards for eco-labels, such as Green Seal and Green Cross in the United States. Id.
19. CRoci ETAL., supranote 3.
20. Id.
21. Jarass & DiMento, supranote 3; Rehbinder, supranote 17.
22. See'Thijs Drupstein &Piet Gilhui, The Netherlands, in SMrrH & KROMAREK, supranote 17; see also
M. POLONSKY & A. MINTu-WIMSATr, ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING (1995).
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Internationally, the International Standards Organization (ISO) Technical
Committee's 14,000 series document will also influence regulatory approaches
since it will "change and broaden the ways environmental managment is conducted and regulated. '"2 Participant countries will decide how the standards are
introduced into the national regulatory approach. Generally, the aim of the
standards is to encourage environmental managment and to rely on market forces
to effect environmental performance improvements, aided by environmental impact analysis and auditing. Companies targeted by the standards will be required
to incorporate environmental regulations into their management activities.
Because of the ISO's worldwide scope, the initiative is significant for the determination of green management thinking.
V. REASONS FOR ADDRESSING IMPLICATIONS OF GREEN MANAGEMENT FOR
THE REGULATORY PROCESS

For several reasons, industry may wish to consider promoting green management which implicates the regulatory process. First, there is an ever-growing
frustration on the part of the private sector in many Western nations based on
their perceptions of over-regulation. Green management may be a means not only
of objectively controlling the number and nature of regulations, but also of
improving and understanding the rationale for regulations.
Second, and related, there exists great public support for environmental
protection through regulation and other means. Industry can expect continued
societal pressure, both directly on firms to behave in a manner perceived to be
environmentally responsive and indirectly through public pressure on regulators
to advocate ever more stringent standards.
Third, environmental protection is increasingly advocated within the firm.
Employees and managers understand, or at least suspect, that environmental
standards can be made compatible with the firm's interests. For example, internal
pressures are felt to promote environmentally sensitive production processes, if
for no other reason than recognition of the link between strong environmental
standards and health and safety in the work place.24
Fourth, and perhaps most appealing, is the hypothesis that green management
strategies assist the firm in gaining control over its risk exposure. In many jurisdictions, the external environment (that set of organizations, institutions and

23. The ISO is a federation of national standard bodies from 70 countries. Member bodies cover the
world from Albania to Zimbabwe. The member body of the United States is the American National Standards
Institute. Personal communication with ISO Representative John Kinsella, Feb. 26, 1966 (on file with the
author).
24. See H. TIBBS, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA FOR INDUSTRY (1993).
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procedures to which the firm must relate and respond)25 is characterized by large,
growing legal liability for environmental insults. 6
Fifth, and more technically and specifically, the processes of rulemaking have
been dominated in recent years by what some observers have called regulatory
science 7 This is a study undertaken to address specific subjects of governmental
regulation (as opposed to, for example, a basic science aimed at generating
knowledge independent of application). Scientific questions are articulated with
a view toward environmental controls. Calls for research proposals are motivated
by the need to meet the requirements of environmental laws. The scientific enterprise may be undertaken in sites dominated by regulator and/or regulatee
scientists. Moreover, the questions asked by agencies in making rules and setting
standards may themselves be trans-scientific, demanding input from policy. 8
Thus a firm which desires to be driving the science rather than to be driven by its
results, as articulated by the regulator or by competing firms, may wish to set the
agendas for at least some of this work. Multinational corporations working in the
European Union will wish to influence the nature of the directives to member
countries in which they operate. A newcomer to a nation developing more
stringent environmental rules, sometimes on the basis of a rather incomplete
science, may wish to introduce the leading work on the health effects of products
to government regulators who will make decisions on standards which will apply
in the country.
Globally, major producers of products with environmental effects will wish
to help determine the basis for setting national controls on the pollutants
associated with those products. An evolving example is Australia's implementation of its self regulatory Greenhouse Challenge Program created to meet the
goals of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (1992).
The exact mix of controls chosen to meet the goals may be highly influenced by
the industries which produce atmospheric pollutants.
VI. ThE LESSONS
This section summarizes the major theoretical perspectives on, and legal
analyses of, regulation and enforcement of environmental law as they relate to the

25.

See JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1976) (discussing the concept of

the external environment).
26.

See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.

27. See Sheliaasanoff. ProceduralChoices in RegulatoryScience, 17 TEcH. IN SocIETY 279 (1995):
K Sexton. Science and Policy in Regulatory Decisionmaking--Gettingthe Facts Right About Hazardous
Waste Pollutants,103 ENVT. HEALTH PERSPECrIVES 213 (1995); McGarity, infra note 28.
28. These are "epistemologically speaking, questions of fact and can be stated in the language of
science, [but] they are unanswerable by science; they transcend science." Alvin M. Weinberg. Science and

Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972). See also Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in AdministrativeRegulation of Science Policy Questions,67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
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firm. This section also identifies and discusses the implications of this knowledge
for the company contemplating a green business strategy. The discussion starts
by addressing the nature of the scientific basis of regulations. It then presents the
work on regulation and business competition, including the international area.
Following this, the potential legal liability associated with environmental.
regulation is discussed. Finally, there is a more general section on opportunities
for cooperation between government and the regulated business community.
A.

Characteristicsof Scientific Information Employed in Lawmaking
Suggest How FirmsEmploying a Green Strategy May Effectively Participate in the Regulatory Process
1. The RegulationInformation Base

Information used in formulating the rules and standards which affect the firm
has been described quite fully in the literature on regulation. Several characteristics of this information in the context of environmental regulations suggest
means by which a green strategy can be influential in participating in the
regulatory process.
Information available to regulators may be: (1) spotty, meaning some
information is relevant and scientifically acceptable but there are gaps in what is
ideally necessary to proceed to a policy or law; (2) excessive, meaning there is too
much data to be intelligently processed and/or some of that information is not
relevant; (3) unavailable, because it is too costly, proprietary, or based on
research not yet completed; (4) inaccessible, meaning its form is not readily
amenable to translation for regulatory purposes; (5) inadequate,requiring conclusions that are transcientific, including generalizations which are directly
relevant to important outcomes from the industry perspective; (6) disputedwithin
the scientific community (is it really informaition?); or (7) of questionable
legitimacy (is the protocol employed generally acceptable or are conclusions
based on too small or unrepresentative samples, bad instrumentation, or sloppy
29
execution?).
In light of the nature of information which may be the basis for regulation,
the firm is concerned about the extent to which government is capable of making
reasonable decisions about standards that are objectively necessary to realize an
accepted environmental goal. The government may err because of the nature of
the information which it must employ in promulgating rules and in setting
standards. Even in trying to promote a green agenda, as legislatively demanded,

29.

Id. See Joseph F. DiMento, "Der Consensus Workshop: Ein Geeignetes Forum fur

Grenzwertsetzung" (The Consensus Workshop: Institutional Innovations for Improving the Scientific Basis
of Environmental Regulations, G. Winter ed. 1986) (Translated version on file with The Transnational
Laioer). The challenge to achieving consensus may, at times, be great. Id.
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government may in fact create additional problems for the firm without
simultaneously achieving its own environmental protection objectives.
Circumstances surrounding a proposed air quality rule in California are
illustrative. In 1991, in an attempt to implement provisions of the Clean Air Act,
there arose the possibility of a general ban on many types of fragrances used in
perfumes, after-shave lotions and related products. The market share loss to
California companies would have been considerable. The California agency
responsible for implementing the rule intended to reduce the alcohol present in
these products. In fact, it had proposed a rule which could have caused a complete
reformulation of the products. A brief summary of the events which prevented the
proposed rule from being enacted anticipates some of the lessons noted below. A
trade association spent a year explaining why fragrances are dependent upon
alcohol as a solvent and why it was impossible to reformulate the existing products. The result was an exemption of the products from the standards and a
redefinition of the standards to reasonable levels-reasonable from the
perspectives of quantitative standards and of the date when they would become
30
effective.
2. Implicationsfor Green Management
These characteristics of information used in the regulatory process suggest
number of actions to the firm whose objective is to promote positive
relationships with the regulator.
First, industry-supplied information may be perceived as more credible if its
source is a firm understood to be sympathetic to environmental protection
objectives and actively pursuing a green management strategy. Second, credibility
can be enhanced by offering high quality information to the regulator, including
information that the firm exclusively possesses. Only the firm, for example, has
exact information on production processes and on likely costs under one
regulatory regime or another. Environmental professionals within the firm can
also help to collect (through specialized channels such as international research
networks), organize, and explain the information from which rules will eventually
be crafted.
As elaborated below, the firm can contribute to the information base through
venues other than the formal rulemaking process. An example is the consensus
workshop employed in the United States in the 1980s.3 ' Green companies may

30. See 17 CAL. CODE OF REG. § 94507 et seq. (1995).
31. Here the leading investigators from industry, government, and public interest groups came together
to review and critique the scientific base of a regulatory relevant environmental issue-such as the health
impacts of formaldehyde, or benzene or an element of automobile emissions. See AIR QUALITY STANDARDS:
Tm ROLE OFTiE HEALTH EFFECTS INSTrruT INCONDUCTING RESEARCH. BRIEING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUD - INDEPENDANT AGENcIEs: COMMnrrr ON APPROPRIATIONS (1986); see
generally CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE, OFFICE OF MEDICAL APPUCATIONS OF RESEARCH,
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take a leadership position in these proceedings. An international example is the
conference held by The Commission of the European Community to assist in
developing approaches to communications regarding major hazards. The context
was implementation of the so-called "Seveso" Directive (82/501/EEC), and the
representatives of numerous interest groups, including industry, throughout
Euro e participated and presented papers. 2 More directly, green companies can
assist in determining the information base upon which regulation is built by
undertaking or sponsoring cutting edge research. They can support forums or
conferences on issues lacking scientific consensus and criticize possibly flawed
science which may appear to be supportive of a given type of environmental
controls. Conversely, the firn can build its green reputation by critiquing results
offered by other groups to counter regulation, which themselves may be flawed,
such as calculations of costs associated with environmental regulation. The green
company can improve the information base and improve the probability that rules
will be based on information that it helped develop.
B. Theories of RegulationSuggest That GreenManagement Can Represent
a Strategyfor Achieving and Maintaininga Competitive Advantagefor
the Firm
The textbook lesson on how regulations are formally processed does not
address what many students of law and public policy consider to be one of the
central issues of government-business relations: the influence of regulated, ana
potentially regulated, parties in the making and enforcing of rules and regulations. 33 This section briefly presents the leading theories on this aspect of regulation and then inquires what they may suggest about the firm adopting a "green
strategy."
Various versions of a "capture theory" of regulation have been expounded.
There exists little empirical support for any particular version, but the notions are
provocative for those studying the green management phenomenon. 4 Under one
understanding of regulatory capture, the regulatory process is dominated by a
class of organized private entities. Government is directed toward promoting and

NATONAL INSTIUTlE OF HFALTH; BEtESDA, MARYLAND.

32. On recent consensus workshop type activity on the subject of multiple chemical sensitivity, for
example, see Barinaga, Better DataNeeded on Sensitivity Syndrome, 251 Sc. 1558 (1991). See H.B.F. GOW
&H. OIWAY, COMMUNI.ATIONS wnTH ThE PUBiC ABoUTMAJOR ACCIDENTHAZARDS (1990) (discussing the

Seveso Directives).
33. See supranotes 9-16 and accompanying text.
34. Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out ofthe Revolving Door:Making Sense of Regulatory
Capture, 12 J. Pu PoL'Y 61 (1976).
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protecting the interests of the most powerful elements within an industry?'
Industry acts to exploit those forces that will protect a valued position gained in
the market. R. Kagan has succinctly summarized the cause of capture as rooted
in "'rent-seeking' by business interests who pressure politicians to promulgate
regulations that disadvantage certain business competitors."' The economic
explanation, as articulated classically by Stigler and others, describes a "market"
for regulation as: the right to control others who might wish to enter the regulated
field either through price regulation or restricted entry into the field. The aim of
those seeking regulation may be to eliminate price competition, restrict entry to
the field, or gain influence over the regulator?'
Other theories see the regulator in a less passive mode. In the public interest
models, rules result from agencies acting dispassionately to address the complexities of interactions in the business community; government objectively
generates and collects regulatory specific information with the goal of controlling
the negative effects of an unregulated activity. In this view, reasonable standards
are articulated with the assistance of in-house government regulators, the public
interest community, and regulated entities. Thus, regulatory results may favor a
leading company, but that is not because of any sinister plot by the industry
leaders. Rather, limitations on competition derive from the natural results of a
small number of usually larger firms being capable of reaching strict control
levels (or convincing policy makers of the wisdom of differential levels) which
were set by others, not demanded by the successful firm.
In a similar but distinct version of regulatory analysis known as "warring
interest groups," regulation, a result of pluralism, comes from competition among
interest groups. Regulation is the result of groups struggling with each other for

35. 'Theliterature on this issue is immense. See D.TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS (1951). MJ.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISsION (1955); G. KOLKo, MH TRIUMPH! OF
CONSERVATISM (1963); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (S. Krislov & L. Musoff eds., 1964); G. KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION (1965); THEODOREJ. LOWI, THE END OF LMEAI.ISM (1969 & 1979): Wilson,
The PoliticsofRegulation, in SOCcAL RESPoNSLnY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT (J. McKie ed.. 1974);
PAULJ. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); MAGAT, ET AL. RULES IN
THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR (1986); Laffont, The Politicsof
GovernmentDecisfon-Making:A Theory of Regulatory Capture,106 Q. J. OFEcON., 1089 (1991); R. Kagan,

Regulatory Enforcement, in HANDBOOK oFREGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (D. Rosenbloom & R.D.
Schwartz eds., 1994); Ayres & John Braithewaite, Partial-IndustryRegulation:A Monopsony Standardfor

ConsumerProtection, 80 CAL. L. REV 13"(1992); Macey, PromotingPublic RegardingLegislationThrough
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest GroupModel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Jennifer L. Forrence &
Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture,Public Interest, and The PublicAgenda, Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.
LAw, ECON&ORG. 167 (1990).
36. Kagan, supranote 35, at 384.
37. Resulting regulation is of low visibility to the public and the results are shrouded in public interest
propaganda. Wilson, supranote 35.
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favorable regulatory treatment and from their attempts to influence administrative
and independent regulatory agencies. 38
1. Implicationsfor Green Management
The regulatory process may thus provide an opportunity for the leaders of an
industry to try to influence government to set standards at a level desired by the
leaders. While that standard may be low, often it is not. When the strategy is to
require the highest level that the industry leaders can achieve, the idea is to drive
out the smaller, or less sophisticated firms, whose resources are insufficient to
reach the higher standard. 39 Leaders of the industry may also seek to be protected
from newer, and perhaps more competitive, firms. To do so, they would promote
a policy through which more rigid standards are applied only to new entrants in
the field
These understandings of influence on the regulatory process suggest several
tactics for the regulated firm. A firm using green management techniques may try
to dominate the recommendations and decision-making of the agency by providing information about leading approaches for achieving environmental
objectives. Industry leaders would present perspectives which may imply a type
of control or a specific standard and link that choice to a greater degree of
environmental protection. Industry leaders may also offer powerful critiques of
information supplied by competitors seeking different, perhaps more relaxed
standards, or seeking to maintain existing norms.
Most forcefully, industry leaders may promote demanding environmental
standards which only they can meet' A leader in the field of emissions
limitations on automobiles, or on their fuel efficiency, might push the U.S.
Congress and in turn the EPA, to set vehicle/mobile source norms at stricter

38. In modem environmental regulation, a relatively objective environmental science may preclude
manipulation by the leading industries of the regulatory process. Kagan, supranote 35. The public interest or
warring pluralism model may today be a more accurate model than a capture formulation. See Gilbert Becker,
The Public Interest HypothesisRevisited: A New Test of Peltzman's Theory of Regulation, 49 PUB. CHOICE
223,226 (1986). There is also a school of thought that sees partial capture as being in the public interest. See
Eddie Dekel & Suzanne Scotchmer,ProfitProtectionin SocialRegulation andLicensing: A Normative Theory
of Capture, Working Paper No. 163, Univ. Of Calif., Berkeley. Dekel and Scotchmer speculate that "a
regulator may generate 'efficient profits' in order to prevent firms from 'shirking' in the amount of care they
take:' Id. at 3.
39. See KOLO. THETRUMPH OF CONSERVATISM, supranote 36; THE POLriCS OF REGULATION, supra
note 36.
40. See Porter& van der Linde, supranote 3. See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAMT. HASSLER,
CLEAN COAL DMRTY AIR (1981); Cleaning Up, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1990; Regulate Us Please, THE

ECONOMIST, Jan. 8,1994, at 69 (describing efforts by waste management companies, including those which
run incinerators, to work with environmental activists to lobby for stricter controls on disposal into landfills).
41. See Wilson, supra note 35.
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levels.' 2 Germany has used its leadership in automobile pollution controls to
attempt to determine standards for the European Union which only a few member
countries could initially achieve. In the early 1970's, Germany's decision to set
lead content of petrol at .4 gle (upper limit) and .15 gle (lower limit), drove the
standard finally reached by the Commission of the European Communities. In
addition to the positive effects on the German forests, the effect on the nation's
car industry was also beneficial.4 3 Though this strategy may generate some
temporary shifts in profits, it may have the benefit of driving some of the
competition from the field.
The links of regulation to business competition are complex and no single
intervention will lead to firm dominance. The impact of these tactics will no
doubt depend on several contextual variables. These include: the level of
pre-existing standards, the distribution of firms within the industry along a
dimension of competitiveness, and the perceived longevity of new standards.
Porter's work addresses the competitive implications in the international
context of strict environmental standards. From a macroeconomic perspective,
nations with the most rigorous environmental norms are said to be the first in
export. Examples include Sweden's stringent standards for noise which led to its
leadership in export of compressors, Japan's strict norms for energy usage in cars
and appliances mandated by The Japanese Energy Conservation Law of 1979,
and pollution control technology standards in Denmark and Germany." Also,
when a country defines environmental standards for products sold domestically
and its standards are more restrictive than those of other countries, it may be able
to limit importation of the regulated products. 5 Examples include the German
Packaging Law and the Danish "bottle law." 46 After a challenge by competitors,
the European Court of Justice upheld the Danish law, concluding that environmental protection is a requirement that can limit the rules of a free market. The
introduction of rigorous standards from an international perspective can also favor
foreign competitors if the domestic industry is not prepared to meet those
standardsf

42. Here the reference includes the U.S. Congress because the field of federal air quality controls is one
of the few where Congress very explicitly determined the standards for a product, rather than addressing a
problem through delegation of rulemaking authority or legislating in general terms such as requiring best
available control technology. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1995) ( discussing emission standards for moving sources).
43. See Nigel Haigh, Panel discussion, The Role of Technical and Economic Analysis in Environmental
Regulation, in SMtrH & KROMAREK, suora note 17.
44. See generally MIcHAELE. PORTER, THE CoMPErrVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS.
45. Id.; CYNTHIA A. MONTOMERY, STRATEGY: SEEKING AND SECURING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAG1
(M.E. Porter ed., 1991); Michael E.Porter, America's Green Strategy, Sci. AM., Apr. 1991; E.J. URBANI &
C.R. RUaI, TRANSNATIONAL ENViRONMENTAL LAW AND ITs IMPACrON COi'ORATE BEHAVIOR (1995).
46. See R. KOLLuRu. ENwRONMEmNALSTRATROISs HANDBOOK (1994).
47. The U.S. automobile industry lost an important market share percentage when Japanese automobile
producers were able to respond more quickly to emissions restrictions under the Clean Air Act.

1996/GreenManagementand the Regulatory Process
[S]trict environmental regulations can, by stimulating innovation,
enhance competitiveness. Government policy can also contribute to
competitiveness if it encourages innovation, by fostering sophisticated
demand (e.g., through forward-looking regulation or government
procurement that stresses new technologies).... Innovation offsets can
not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental regulations but also
lead to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries not subject to
similar regulations.!8
The innovations which, in some cases, have offsets that exceed the costs of
compliance might include: new technologies which minimize the cost of
compliance itself, improvements of the affected product, or enhancements of
related processes 9 For example, in response to EPA regulations, U.S.
corporation Cummins Engines,50 developed a low emissions diesel engine which
allowed it to gain international market position. Porter and Van der Linde,
however, caution that "standards should not be too far ahead, or too different in
character, from those that are likely to apply to foreign competitors.S''
DuPont is an interesting case in point. In the 1980s, DuPont controlled about
fifty percent of the U.S. domestic market of CFCs. From an international
perspective, DuPont was also a major producer, representing twenty-five percent
of the world's total CFC production. In September 1987, The Montreal Protocol
was signed by twenty-seven countries, 52 to reduce the production and consumption of CFCs which had been linked to the degredation of the ozone layer.
This treaty might have been seen as a menace for the CFC industry and DuPont.
Instead, in March 1988, DuPont announced its decision to cease production of
CFCs. In 1990, while the Montreal Protocol was renegotiated to include the
banning of CFCs, DuPont was in the process of making enormous investments
to develop alternative products. In fact, DuPont made twice the investment of the
entire rest of the industry. Its strategy as industry leader, therefore, was to push
regulators to force consumers toward substitute products and achieve a

48. Porter & van derLinde, supranote 2 at 14.
49. Porter explicitly links process offsets to "reduced regulatory, liability, and public relations
exposure" Id.at 17. See also Peter M. Haas, The FutureofInternationalEnvironmentalGovernance.MWM
,
Oct. 1995 (reporting that sales of environmental goods and services could reach US$SO billion by the end of
this century). Haas also notes that European industries report that environmental protection efforts were taken
in response to legal requirements. Id. at 36.
50. An Indiana based multinational corporation with sites in over 130 countries and with 93% of its
goods sold outside of the United States.
51. Id.at39.
52. By 1990, the number of signatories had grown to 80; by 1992, more than 100 signatories were
involved and that number is expected to increase as various obligations under the agreement come into force.
Ian H. Rowlands, The Fourth Meeting of the Partiesof the Montreal Protocol: Report and Reflection, 35
ENVT. 25 (1993).
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at the same time a reduction in negative environcompetitive advantage. Happily,
53
mental impacts was achieved.
Another set of implications of theory on regulation goes to the obverse perspective: how society can avoid regulatory capture and promote a more green
environmental management. Some observers conclude that to avoid capture, or
more generally the degradation of strict norms, a supportive constituency is
important. Active, vigilant groups can forestall change from an aggressive
government regulatory policy to a "satisfying" or a self-regulating one. "4Sabatier,
for example, calls for the active dissemination of scientific information about the
regulated activity and encouragement of citizen participation. The environmental
constituency or stakeholders55 (i.e., those in the larger society who support the
activities of the green managed companies), can .act to promote the standards
which the green companies can achieve by: (1), themselves offering information
in the rulemaking process; (2) through environmental education campaigns; and
(3) through litigation aimed at forcing agencies to strictly implement the law.
They can also promote the continued pro-environmental regulatory activity of the
government. For the green managed company, it follows that providing environmental groups with information about its green agenda-how it is acting to set
and meet higher standards-will maintain pressure on government for the stricter
standards. The company can publicly disclose its record in a way which makes
it the basis for comparisons by both those pushing for strong environmental
regulations and the regulators themselves. Industry leaders might join with
environmental groups and others in the public interest community to communicate with regulators, in ways aimed at promoting an increasingly sophisticated environmental science base for rulemaking.m Pressure from environmental
groups on the green company is particularly important in view of critiques that
some firms exploit the benefits of being perceived as leaders in environmental
protection when, in fact, they make none other than cosmetic or public relations
changes in their performances.

53.

It is interesting to note, however, that DuPont has been characterized as among the most polluting

companies in the United States, as measured by its listing on the priority list for Superfund. Faye Rice. Who
ScoresBest on the Environmen? FORTuNE, July 26,1993, at 114. Fortune also reported, "DuPont successfully

delayed the phase-out of CFCs for 15 years because it was the world's largest producer of the same destroyers.
As the inevitable deadline approached, the company stepped up its promotion of substitute HCFC, which are
less potent but still ozone depleting, instead of developing alternatives that do not harm the environment." Id.
at 118. Furthermore, Greenpeace and other environmentalists have been highly critical of Dupont and The
World Bank on this issue. See S. KRETZMANN, MONEY TO BURN: THE WORLD BANK, CHEMICAL COMPANIES
AND OZONE DEPLEnON.
54. Paul Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate and Less
Pessimistic Theory of 'Clientele Capture,' 6 POL'YScL 301 (1975).
55. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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C. Green ManagementMay Be a Means of Limiting Legal Liabilityfor the
Firm
Potential liability of the firm under environmental law is a significant threat
to future operations and a significant factor in business decision-making.7 Well
documented, high perceived risk of liability of the company for environmental
degradation results from several phenomena in the regulatory environment of the
firm.
1.

The Presence of Environmental "Watchdogs" in the Legal System

These citizen activist groups and environmental non-governmental organizations have access to the courts through liberal standing rules which allow for
judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies on environmental protection. Regulators are often perceived by the watchdogs to be overly responsive
to the economic concerns of business, rather than sufficiently committed to
environmental protection. 58 Examples include: (I) lawsuits initiated by environmentalists in the United States which successfully challenged the government's
failure, in the early years of implementation of the Clean Air Act, to list lead as
a criterion pollutant for which national ambient air quality standards would be set;
(2) government's failure to list substances as hazardous air pollutants under the
same law; (3) government's failure to interpret the Clean Air Act to prevent the
significant deterioration of existing clean air regions; and (4) government's
attempt to sell logging rights in habitat protected for endangered species. 59 In the
European Union, while not classified as citizen suits, citizens file complaints to
the European Commission, for failure to comply with directives on environmental
impact assessment.'
2. Watchdog Activities Independent of FormalLegalActions
Activist groups may bring to the public or the regulator's attention alleged
noncompliance, or non-environmentally friendly actions. This raises the possibility that others will seek redress from the firm.6 ' Green movements in the

57.

See ENvmoNMENTALLIABILTY AND REGULATON INEUROPE (M. Brealy ed., 1993).

58.

JOSEPHL.SAX,DEMMINGTHEENVIRONMENT A STRATEGY FOR CmZEN AcTON (1971).

59.

See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Society v. John Evans (U.S. Forest Service) and Washington Contract

Loggers Assoc., 771 F.Supp. 1081 (USDC, W.D. 1991).
60.

See Report on the Application of the EuropeanLaw in MemberStates, 2 ELNI NEWs. 36 (1995)

(concerning Directive 85/337/EEC of 6/85).
61.

A June 1993 Securities and Exchange Commission staff accounting bulletin required firms to

disclose information about their current and potential environmental liabilities. That mandate has not been
followed by a number of firms: 36% responded in a survey that "there would be absolutely no mention
whatsoever of the companies' environmental compliance activities.. ." PR NEwsWMRE, Mar. 7,1994.
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United States and throughout Europe, especially Germany, have formalized this
activism 2
3. The Evolution of Legal Liability Rules
Several rules relevant to, and often based in, environmental law create greater
risks of legal actions for business practices, of which some practices have historically been considered routine. Evolving "toxic torts" liability doctrines in the
common law; joint and several liability, and vicarious liability are of particular
63
concern.

a. Toxic Tort Liability
Among the significant movements in liability under common law doctrines
(and related statutory law such as Superfund, The Comprehenisve Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liablilty Act [CERCLA]) is strict liability or
liability without fault. 4 This doctrine makes a party liable for damages caused by
a product or activity that is considered "ultra hazardous," or in more modem
jurisprudence, "abnormally dangerous," independent of the care taken to prevent
injury. 65 Although notions of fault are considered in some judicial treatment of
even strict liability, other courts and commentators reject this position, moving
beyond an "abnormally dangerous test." 66 Also relevant are doctrines which
assign liability independent of prior knowledge of potential for harm or violation
of some standard of care; liability based on market share of a product; and
liability for failure to employ a leading edge process or strategy.

62. See generally RJ.DALrON, TiB GREEN RA
(1994).
63.

OW: ENMvIONMENrAL GROUPS INWESTERN EUROPE

See generally G.W. BOSTON &M.S. MADDEN, LAW oFENVRONMNAL AND TOXiCTORTS (1994).

Damages may be recoverable even for the fear of some future harm (such as developing cancer) related to a
business practice. Id. See generally Baron v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 1994 WL 608531 (N.D. Cal.). On the
advisability of Europe's moving toward the U.S. liability model, see FUhrsupranote 19. On the degree of
incorporation of liability rules into international environmental law, see G. DOEKER & T. GEHRING, LIABILITY

FOR ENvxRoNmEN AL DAMAGE, in Tm E"EcSvENEss OF ITERNATioNAL ENvIRoNmENrAL AGREEmENTS
(D.H. Sand ed., 1992). On the concerns about the insufficiency of liability law in Europe, see Drupsteen &
Gilhul, supranote 22.

64. 42U.S.C. § 9601 etseq. (1995).
65. See generallyBOSTON &MADDEN supra note 63.
66. See R A'rEsmEm (SECOND) opToR'Ts § 520 (1977) (stating that a balancing of factors is required
to assess the appropriateness of an activity in a place where it is being undertaken); cf. State Department of

Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 NJ. 473,468 A.2d 150 (1983) (assessing a higher standard of
care).
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b. Joint and Several Liability
The doctrine ofjoint and several liability is critical to a firm's strategy. Under
U.S. law it has become most relevant under Superfund.6 In the environmental
context the doctrine holds that even for a minor contribution to an environmental
problem (i.e., transporting a small quantity of a regulated material to a hazardous
waste site), a party may be liable for the full cost of clean up if the other parties
cannot be found or are without resources. 68 The parties are referred to as
"potentially responsible parties.' The application of the doctrine can be
draconian, and it for the time being is not applied in Western European law.6 9
A relevant example of the strict application is the U.S. Federal Court of
Appeal case of UnitedStates v. Monsanto. Monsanto failed to convince a court
that it should not be held liable under the Superfund law although it was only one
of several contributors of waste to a site that it neither owned nor operated?'
Monsanto argued that it was not a primary contributor and should not be held
liable. The court concluded that defendant generators like Monsanto had "the
burden of disproving causation... (having) profited from the generation and
inexpensive disposal of hazardous waste." Monsanto failed in its challenges to
joint and several liability and to retroactive liability. The court's language
rejecting the divisibility contention of the companies which had refused to settle
the case suggests the wisdom of practices that fully track one's wastes:
Common sense counsels that a million gallons of certain substances
could be mixed together without significant consequences, whereas a few
pints of others improperly mixed could result in disastrous consequences.
Under other circumstances proportionate volumes of hazardous substances may well be probative of contributory harm. In this case, how-

67. See supranote 61 and accompanying text. The popular name for the act, Superfund, derives from
its goal of creating a fund to be used to clean up the nation's most seriously polluted waste dumps. It has been
interpreted to create both strict and joint and several liability, and to allow recovery by the government of clean
up actions for a liberal inventory of costs.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1995).
69. See Rock V. Grundman, The SuperMorassof Superfund, BUS. & SOC'VY REV. 26 (1991). See also
Charles . Corbett & LukN. Van Wassenhove, The Green Fee:Internalizingand OperationalizingEnvironmental Issues, CAL. MG.MT. REV. 123 (1993); CongressDropsa Superfund Overhaul,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
1994. at Al; Melissa Healy, Moves to Reform Superflnd Killedby Squabbles, L.A. TIES, Oct. 6,1994. at
A23; Chemicals Accident Preventionand Cleanup-77Te Seveso Directive,Superfunt, andLiability Issues,
in SMrrm & KROMAREK supra note 17; see generally M. BREA.E, ENVIRONMENTAL LLAEILrrIES AND

REGULAIroN INEUROPE (The Hague International Business Pub. Ltd.) (1993).
70. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir., 1988), cert. denied,490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
71. Id. The facility owners bad allowed over 7000 fifty-five gallon drums of chemical waste to be
improperly disposed. Id. at 164.
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ever, volume could not establish the effective contribution of each waste
generator to the harm at the Bluff Road site. 2
c. Vicarious Liability

Vicarious liability is another potential vulnerability for the firm under
environmental law.

3

This term refers generally to imposing liability on some

actors for the actions of others, based solely on the relationship between the
parties7 4 The situation can arise within a firm and also across firms.
Several theories find horizontal company liability, i.e. liability for actions of
another firm with whom the subject company has business relations. They include
liability based on instrumentality, agency, accomplicity, and conspiracy.

With vertical liability, an executive or other high level manager may be
subject to prosecution for the actions (or failure to act) of lower level employees.
An individual can be held liable if he or she had reason by corporate position to
have the responsibility and authority to prevent or to promptly correct a violation
and failed to do so. Liability can extend to those who fail to discover violations
or fail to provide adequate supervision of activities which may be the sources of

violations. Scienter (to act knowingly with a criminal intent) is not always
required for prosecution under environmental law. Some courts have held that
certain criminal environmental laws may be treated as strict liability laws such
that the level of knowledge to be established need not include knowledge that a

duty was breached or a standard or rule violated. The courts, however, are not in
unanimity on this point. For example, other courts have held that while they
cannot read a scienter requirement into law, they will apply a balancing test and

will scrutinize whether a conviction in the absence of some type of scienter might
violate the due process requirement of the U.S. Constitution.

5

72. Id. at 172-73.
73. See Individual and Collective Responsibility Under Environmental Criminal Law, International
ModelsforCriminalLiability of Enterprises,INmim REP. FORTHE COM ARA EAND EMPIRIcAL RESEARCH
PROJEC (Max-Planck-Institute forForeign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg Im Breisgau.) [hereinafter
INTERim REPORT]. In Belgium see the notion of the "breakfast executive" which is the individual 'auto-

matically liable when criminal acts arise out of the firms business activities." Id.
74. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); see also Civil and CriminalLiability of Corporate
Officers Under FederalEnvironmental Laws, 20 ENV. Rpm 337 (1989).
75. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution protect against the taking of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONSr. amends. V & XIV. State law also creates liability
rules for the firm. Not as a response solely to environmental crimes, but as a more general corporate control
measure, California voters passed an initiative, Proposition 115, The Criminal Liability Act of 1989, commonly
referred to as "Be a Managen Go to Jail." CAL. PENAL CODE § 357 (West 1995). The Act makes corporate
directors and other managers guilty for crimes if they have actual knowledge of serious concealed dangers
which are matters of state regulation and they fail to warn those employees who are affected by the dangers
and fail to inform the appropriate agency, the California Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Id.
Penalties for violations are up to US$1,000,000 for corporations and up to three years imprisonment and
US$25,000 in fines for individuals. Id. The knowledge requirement under the California act is awareness of
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Even though this law appears to be rather harsh, the U.S. Supreme Court has
said: "public policy may require that in prohibition or punishment for particular

acts, it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do that at his peril and
will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance... Legislation may,

in particular instances be harsh, but... this court cannot set aside legislation
because it is harsh." 76
d. CorporateCriminalLiability

A particular set of concerns involving liability of the firm arises from the fact
that, in some of the world's jurisprudence, the corporation itself can be liable for

wrongdoing.77 While this is more often the case in common law countries, even
in some civil law jurisdictions the aversion to corporate criminal liability has been
changing. In 1983, for example, the Council of Europe created a committee to
advise on the introduction of corporate criminal liability into member-state

legislation. In 1988, a recommendation to consider the concept of criminal
liability for corporations [Recommendation No. R(88)18] was received. France
and the Netherlands have amended their laws to permit some use of the doctrine.

Romania and the United Kingdom also have some provisions for corporate
liability. 8 The interest is not in imprisoning a corporation's chief executive
officer, but rather, in punishing the corporation. 9 The mainstream of the law
danger or possession of facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe there was danger. Id.
76. Shevlin-Carpenterv. Minn., 218 U.S. 57,70 (1910). See alsoUnited States v. Weitzenhoff, 51 F.3d
1523 (9th cir. 1993), cert. denied,sub. nom. Mariani v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 939 (1995); United States v.
Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d cir. 1995); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599 (5th cir. 1991).
77. INTEUM REPoRT, supra note 73.
78. Some countries (mostly civil law jurisdictions (Bruce Coleman, Is CorporateCriminalLiability
Really Necessary?29 SW. LJ.908, 912 (1975)) presume that a corporation cannot be criminally liable because
of the notion that a corporation can not do wrong: societasdelinquerenon potest. Mueller, "Mens Rea andthe
Corporation"A Study of the Model Penal Code Positionon CorporateCriminalLiability, 19 U. OF PITT. L.
REV. 21, 28 (1957). See INTERIM REPORT, supranote 73. But see C. WELLS, CORPORA71ONS AND CRIMINAL
RESoNsmLrrv (1993). See generally Christopher Stone, The Placeof EnterpriseLiability in the Control of
CorporateConduct,90 YALE LJ.1 (1980).
79. Several ways of punishing the corporate entity exist. In the United States, for example, sanctions

include: putting the corporation in the custody of a U.S. Marshall; requiring reforms of operations; forcing
community service by the corporation andior individuals; fining (including fines of a magnitude that would
"remove all ofthe organization's net assets"); imposing substantial restitution; and providing notice to victims.
STATESEmENcING CMMisSOiN, GiDINESMANUAL 357 (1991); seealso William S. Lofquist,
See UNT
Legislating OrganizationalProbation:State Capacity,Business Power,and CorporateCrime Control,27 L.
& Soc'Y REv. 741 (1993). There is also a rising chorus of interest in use of probation against corporations. See
John Collins Coffee, Jr., CorporateCrime andPunishment:A Non-ChicagoView of the Economics ofCriminal
Sanctions, 17 AM. CPIM. L. REV. 419 (1980); Kenneth M. Koprowicz, CorporateCriminal Liabilityfor
Workplace Hazards:A Viable Optionfor Enforcing Workplace Safety? 52 BROOK. L. REV. 183 (1986).
Combinations of sanctions are available under the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including fines in
addition to probation. Emmett H. Miller, FederalSentencing Guidelinesfor OrganizationalDefendants,46
VAND. L.REV. 198 (1993). For treatment in Australia, see John Braithwaite, Penaltiesfor White-CollarCrime,
in COMPL.x COMmERCiALFRAUD (P.N. Grabosky ed., 1992).
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transfers the doctrine of respondeatsuperiorfrom the law of torts to the realm of
criminal law. Under respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the
acts and intent of an agent outside of an actual agency relationship, even if the
agent acted adversely to the principal, when the principal cloaks the agent with
ostensible authority. s
As Leigh offers, "[i]n one view, corporate criminal liability serves the same
function of vicarious liability; that is, the function of inducing management to
police the observance of legislation on its part and on the part of its employees.
In the alternative, corporate criminal liability may be viewed as a form of liability
intended primarily to deter management itself from utilizing corporate forms and
assets in the commission of offenses." '
Managers are concerned over the impact of this kind of liability. Scholars
have asserted that executives are influenced by the disruption and negative reputational impact which occurs when corporations are sanctioned.82 Also worrisome
to the firm is the alleged ease with which prosecutions can be undertaken under
this theory of liability. It "usually is quite easy for prosecutors to establish the
collective guilt of a corporation [and some have speculated that juries are more
willing to convict an organization than an individual]." 83 Practical considerations
sometimes overwhelm considerations of concern for the rights of the manager and
lead to decisions to pursue the corporation because:
"[lt may be less burdensome to investigate, charge, and convict the
entity alone than to assign individual responsibility and prove individual
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... When the government charges an
organization... it may not have to demonstrate precisely who committed
the offense, or the mental state of individual actors in the organizational
hierarchy ... prosecuting organizations alone does make convictions
substantially easier to attain." 84

80. See Craig L Griffin, CorporateScienterUnderthe SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 89 B.Y.U. L.

REv. 1227 (1989). See also Lawrence Lederman, Criminal Law Perpetratorand Corporation:Rethinking a
Complex Triangle,76 J. oFCIM. L. &CRmNOLOGY
285 (1985).
81. L.H. Leigh. The Criminal Liability of Corporationsand Other Groups, 9 0rTAWA L. REv. 247
(1977).
82. Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime:
Individualism, Collectivism andAccountabilty, 11 SI NEYL. REV. 468 (1988). "IN]on-financial impacts-loss
of corporate and individual prestige, declines in morale, distracting from getting on with the job, and
humiliation in the witness box-were acutely felt." Id.
83. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Controlofthe CriminalConduct of Organizations,71 B.U.L. REV. 421
(1991).
84. Id. at 425,427. Furthermore, when the environmental law defendant is an organization, it can be
compelled to deliver up information which can be used against it, a vulnerability which for individuals is
protected against by the Fifth Amendment, which says in relevant part: "No person... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. When organizations are prosecuted
individuals can in fact lose the constitutional protection. Joseph F. DiMento, Criminal Enforcement of
EnvironmentalLaw, 525 ITHANNALS OFTHE AM. AcAD. OFPOL. & SOC. SC. 134 (1993).
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Criminal procedural rules also facilitate prosecutions against the organizational
entity. In the United States, for example, organizations have no privilege against

self-incrimination. Thus, an organization must respond to a subpoena through
some individual, even if the material subpoenaed will incriminate the organization
and its employees8 5
4. Implicationsfor Green Management
A core concern of these liability rules is to promote responsible management

of activities which affect the environment.6 This is a noble objective but one
sometimes pursued in ways which hurt the generally compliant business entity.
First, at least in theory, green management can promote public sector goals
while decreasing legal vulnerability of the firm. Most fundamentally, innovations
in green management may substantively lessen the vulnerability which the firm
experiences. New technologies, process changes, and management controls may

facilitate environmental compliance and substantively obviate causes of action
under environmental law. Porter cites the Tobyhannan Army Depot case as an
example of how innovation can limit a firm's liability exposureY Between 1985

and 1992, improvements in sandblasting, cleaning, plating and painting
operations by88the corporation reduced generation of hazardous waste by eighty-

two percent.
Second, and more speculatively, green management may be the basis for
legal conclusions under both statutory and common law (and later in the sen-

tencing stages) that liability should be circumscribed and punishment limited.
Green management may evoke sympathy in the courts for the firm subjected to
liability rules that seem unfair when applied in the context of numerous "pro
environment" actions of a green company! 9 Both judges and juries may be in

85. Saltzburg, supranote 83, at 428.
86. This is not always the complete rationale: public policy may be seeking the "deep pocket" to
remedy a problem without having concluded that the corporation has acted in a particularly anti social way.
Broad social policy sometimes dominates the liability logic. As stated in an important California case, the
defendants were "better able to bear the costs of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective product:'
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,607 P.2d 924,936 (1980), cert. denied,449
U.S. 912 (1980).
87. See Porter & van der Linde, supranote 2, at 21.
88. Id.at 21-22.Almost US$7 million in environmental liability costs, and over a half million dollars
in disposal costs were avoided by the reduction. Id.
89. The synopsis of a fairly recent D.C. Circuit Superfund [CERCLA] case suggests some of this
complexity. The court upheld the EPA's "limitation of Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements
(ARARs) to generally applicable substantive requirements; determination that SDWA Maximum Contaminant
Level Goals (MCLGs) that are set at zero are not ARARs; determination that cleanups are cost-effective when
costs are proportional to overall effectiveness; classification of permanence as one of five primary balancing
criteria; cancerrisk range; promulgation of a de minimis exception from obtaining permits for remedial actions.
The court rejected as unripe challenges to... EPAs preference for MCLs or MCLGs--over FWPCA water
quality criteria-as ARARs for ground water cleanup:' 23 ENvTLL. REP. (1993). Under federal law in the
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fluenced. Good green management may make enforcers less eager to draconianly
apply doctrines of strict liability orjoint and several liability. Green management
may be a counter influence to the forces seeking to punish top management for
the actions of lower level employees. It may also make government less able to
do so because the company sets in place both roles and processes which indicate
a commitment to environmental protection and compliance with law. From a
broader perspective, green management activities may translate to a political
climate opposed to mandating further rules and standards.
Third, green management may lead to a recruitment of environmental watchdogs. Rather than seeking legal action against the green firm, activist groups may
use the firm's programs and policies as models for the industry in general.
Ideally, the result would go beyond environmental groups choosing to pursue
other defendants and would lead to their actively promoting the firm's green
agenda. °
How can the firm specifically limit its vulnerability and risks? Actions that
the firm may take are legion. They include: (1) appointments of high level
directors in charge of environmental compliance whose duties include reporting
directly to the chief executive officer, working with regulatory agencies, and
monitoring regulations; (2) creation of internal audit systems to prevent-or at
least decrease the incidence of environmental violations; (3) installation of information systems that assure that instances of non compliance are communicated
to high level management; and (4) signing on to environmental codes of conduct.
An example is the Ceres Principles in the United States, once known as the
Valdez Principles (with parallels elsewhere including the Japan-based Valdez
Society). These principles include a commitment to, inter alia, waste reduction;
the use of renewable resources if possible; wise use of energy; the appointment
of environmental managers and directors; and protection of company whistleblowers against retaliation. 9' Other strategies include the appointment of environmentalists to the Board of Directors and designation of a share of the firm's profits to environmental or other public interest groups. Patagonia is an interesting
example.' Patagonia is a company in Ventura, California, which produces
recreational clothing. The firm dedicates 1.1 percent of its sales revenue to
environmental organizations, distributing small amounts to more than two

United States, the nature of the penalty imposed for environmental violations is explicitly tied to consideration
of the firm's attempts to remain in compliance with environmental laws and to other subjective considerations.
See The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1002 (1995).
90. See infra notes 102-26 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of support groups on
regulatory agencies).
91. See Michael Parrish, GM Signs onto Environmental Code of Conduct, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994,
at Dl.
92. See Peter Carlin, PureProfit, L.A. TIMES (MAG.), Feb. 5, 1995, at 13 (profiling Patagonia). M.
WINN, CORPORATELEADERSHPANDPOLIcaESFORTENATRALENmONMENT (mimeograph, Aug. 30. 1994)
(discussing Patagonia's strategy).
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hundred groups. Patagonia recently aligned itself with one important segment of
the environmental community by sponsoring ads in The New York Times
opposing the U.S. ratification of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades
(GATT), arguing that its implementation could threaten implementation of
domestic environmental and consumer safety law. 3
At a less formal level, the firm may take actions which generally communicate a commitment to environmental protection. It can develop and lead the
field in entering green labeling campaigns; it can foster programs of recycling
which exceed government rules; it can sponsor environmental education and
activities of non governmental organizations and not for profit environmental
groups; and it can go beyond the Ceres principles.
Dow Chemical Company provides an interesting example of the elements of
developing a green strategy. As Fortunemagazine summarized: "Dow Chemical,
a company whose name was once synonymous with napalm, Agent Orange, and
fearsome opposition to what former chairman Paul Oreffice called 'nitpicking,
ridiculous regulations,' is now among America's top ten environmental
champions." 94 Dow took several actions to change its image including: (1)
creating an Environmental Advisory Council which meets with senior managers
and board members four times a year at the company's corporate headquarters;
(2) providing incentives, including salary increases and bonuses, to employees
who assist in reaching environmental objectives; (3) adding an environmental
criterion to each employee's appraisal form; (4) placing its senior environmental
official on its Board of Directors; (5) formally terminating environmentally
questionable practices such as deep well injection of hazardous wastes; and (6)
developing a formal hazardous and solid waste and emissions reduction
program. 5 International examples include Ciba Geisy which is a multinational
corporation based in Switzerland.96
The firm can also, postfacto, attempt to limit its liability. Special settlement
agreements may be valuable. Recently, EPA has entered into a number of these
in its enforcement activities. Through the program, whose actions are referred to
as Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs), companies volunteer to take
actions not otherwise legally required. In exchange, the penalties owed for violations are reduced. "Generally they must pay $2.50 in SEP expenditures for
every $1 in penalty reduction that they are granted.... The largest portion of
SEPs involves companies making direct expenditures for pollution reduction or
prevention ... other forms of SEPs include environmental restoration projects

93. As a Business Patagonia Stands to Gainfrom GAT, So Why Do We Say 'No Thanks'?, N.Y.
TME, Nov. 15, 1994, at A15.
94. Rice, supra note 53
95. Id.
96. See WALDmEM HopENaEcK, THE GREEN MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION: LEsSONS IN ENVIRONMnrAL EXCELLENCE (1993).
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... environmental audits, public awareness projects... .,97
Some corporate
lawyers are also advocating an internal environmental audit privilege, shielding
information collected in self regulation from disclosure, and calling for a policy
of dismissing all penalties including criminal penalties against companies who
voluntarily report violations which their audits disclose. 8 Others would reduce
fines and otherwise mitigate punishment if the firm efficiently self enforces
regulatory law.99The strict Federal Sentencing Guidelines include fine mitigation
for corporations
that effectively monitor and promptly report violations to the
government.1w°
D. Green ManagementMay Be a GeneralNegotiating Tool in Interactions
with RegulatoryAgencies
More generally, green management may assist the firm in making more
cooperative its relationships with public regulators independent of instrumental
concern with specific proposed regulations or enforcement. Rather than opposing
the introduction of new environmental standards and rules, the active firm may
help create the climate which generates the rules. It may adopt a preventative
strategy and work to influence the agency response to the regulated industry
position. Porter and others have claimed that, worldwide, too much effort is spent
in fighting the regulatory process itself, rather than having government-industry
cooperation on the substantive objectives of environmental law.10' Superfund has
rapidly become the classic example, but Porter and others assert that the problem
is more general throughout the industrialized world and "evidence if it were
available, would show that a substantial fraction of spending on the environment,
and of the revenues of environmental products and services firms, is consumed
in the struggleitself,not in cleaning
up the environment' with results which are
12
immensely counterproductive. 0

97. Lewis, VokuntaryAgreementsfor Environmental Protection, Remarks at the Annual Mecting of
the Environmental Law Network International, Strasbourg, France (Oct. 15, 1995). See also 59 Fed. Reg.

59,921 (1994) (publishing the EPA's final rule under its Early Reductions Program implementing § 112(i)(5)
of the Clean Air Act). The rule offers an extension of a compliance date to sources that achieve substantial
early reductions of hazardous air pollutant emissions. ld1
See also Massachusetts, where the Commission may
waive permits in noted circumstances (or expedite the permitting process) if a zero-discharge approach is
adopted. Ld.
The Commissioner's policy is that the company will face "a careful review" if it wants to continue
discharges. See Porter & van der Linde, supranote 2, at 42.
98. Lewis, supra note 97.
99. Jennifer Arlen, The PotentiallyPerverse Effects of Corporate CriminalLiability, 13 . oFLEaAL
STUD. 833 (June 1994).
100. UNrrED STATES SarENcoNG COMWVSSION, GUIDELM'S MANUAL., § 3ElI (Nov. 1991).
101. Porter and van der Linde, supranote 2; Michael Porter, THECOMpmTrirvEADv ANTAGE OF NATONS

(1990).
102. "Firmswill adopt short term bandaids instead of fundamental solutions. Progress will be slow. Both
sides will battle over every inch of territory." Porter & van derLinde, supranote 2. These authors and many
others mention the 1992 Rand Institute of Civil Justice study which found that 88% of the money which
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The firm can act in many ways, both direct and some subtle, to positively
influence the regulator. Among the former tactics, the firm can actively engage
in collaborative rulemaking with the agency-referred to in the United States as
negotiatedrulemaking.Negotiated rulemaking is one of several strategies which
fall under the general rubric of alternative dispute resolution.10 3 Negotiated Rule-

making or "Reg-Neg" brings together interested parties early in the rulemaking

process'04 and provides them with an opportunity to create the rules which will
affect them. The objective is to foster a consensual approach to, for example, the
setting of a standard. Reg-Neg participants may also translate a tentative agree-

ment into a consensus document (a summary of findings and issues which all
interested parties accept and which the rulemaking agency can utilize as a basis
for its conclusions). The EPA has made use of reg-neg on a small number of
occasions, including the creation of rules regarding the Federal Clean Air Act
motor vehicle emissions non-conformance penalties, standards for wood stoves,
and standards for farnworker protection against the effects of pesticides. 10 5
Negotiation with the regulatory agency can lessen the uncertainty which
industry experiences in the regulatory process. °6 Also,since agencies often have
access to the leading information in a sector, the firm can benefit by tapping into

this knowledge of innovation ongoing elsewhere. In the United States, limitations

insurers paid on Superfund claims between 1986 and 1989 was used to pay administrative and legal costs. Id.
Th7e actual clean up cost percentage was 12% of the payout. Id.
103. See generally G. BINAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DisPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE
(1985) (discussioning ADR); L. SussKIND & . CRuiKsHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC Dispurus (1987); Susskind & McMahon, The Theory andPracticeof
Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J.OF REG. 133 (1985); GOLDBERG, El AL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (1992); R. FISHER & W. URY, GEmrING To YES (1981);
CPR, MODEL ADR PROCEDURES, MEDIATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES (1991); KUBEY, YOU DON'T ALWAYS
NEED A LAWYER: How TO RESOLVE YOUR LEGAL DISPUTES WITHOUT COSTLY LITIGATION (199I); MOORE,
THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (1986); SINGER, SETTLING
DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1990). The Federal
government has taken a number of steps adopting ADR. See The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990, 59 Fed. Reg. 59715 (1994) (discussing proposed rules on adopting ADR by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); Perritt, NegotiatedRulenaking in Practice,5 . OFPOL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1 (1986)
(examining negotiated rulemaking); D. PRrziR &D.S. DALTON, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKI;G SOURCEBOOK
(1990).
104. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional process). See also
Regulatory Reform Initiatives:HearingsBefore the Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, Regulation
Through Negotiation, The NegotiatedRulemakIng Act 1989, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.; ROBERT PAEHLKE &
DOUGLAS TORGERSON, MANAGING LEVIATHAN: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND TnEADMINISTRATVE STATE
(1990) (discussing the situation of cooperative rulemaking in Canada and in Western Europe).
105. Negotiation in the regulatory process is relevant to several activities. Advocates promote negotiating
environmental agreements ranging from the details of permits to the terms of an environmental audit or
compliance review.
106. This makes for an interesting dynamic and may suggest astrategic choice for a regulated firm: while
uncertainty is an objective obstacle to fostering compliance by industry, allegeduncertainty is also a tool that
the finm may use in criticizing regulatory agencies. Negotiated rulemaking, objectively superior in generating
acceptable standards, can also take away one of the firm's arguments for less regulation.
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on this exchange exist because some information may be proprietary, but this

restraint may not apply to the regulatory agency's knowledge of innovations in
other countries-including those where green activity is in the forefront such as
Germany and Japan.' °7 Yet another benefit may be identifying markets for green
products.
The firm can engage in collaborativeresearchwith government. The Health
Effects Research Institute, created and funded by both the U.S. federal government and the automotive industry to do 'egulatory relevant research on the health°8
effects of automotive pollutants, was an early example in the United States.'
While not exactly duplicated, this type of opportunity to influence the regulatory
research109agenda is available in many parts of the world, most notably in

Europe.

The firm can offer its environmental innovations to the public sector for
possible use. These may be process innovations which have applicability in other
sectors; new technologies which the firm can make known to agencies seeking
information on best available equipment; or new applications of existing products
which may have positive environmental effects in arenas related to the missions
of regulatory agencies."0 The case of Arm & Hammer nicely demonstrates this
latter possibility. At the end of the 1980s, the company launched again into the
market of bicarbonate soda, focusing on the environmentally benign characteristics of its products. Working closely with environmental groups and also
supported by public agencies, the company discovered new possibilities for its
product for house cleaning-as a substitute for more toxic materials. The
company decided to create "environmental centers" in supermarkets. These were
conceptualized in collaboration with environmental groups: the aim was to
educate consumers about the environmentally favorable attributes of the new products. In a short time, the name Arm & Hammer was associated with not only the
benefits of these new products, but also with a concrete response to solving

107. Fletcher & Sobin, The InternationalMarketfor Environmental Goods and Services: The United
States, Germany, andJapanExport the Most, EPA J., Fall 1994, at 35; see Y. Moore, Breakthrough in Plastics
Recovery: Vinyl Cycle ® Units are Operatingon Three Continents,EPA J., Fall 1994, at 18.
108. See DiMento, supranote 25; Stone, No Meeting of the Minds on Asbestos, 254 Sc. 928 (1991)
(describing polarization of analysis to the point that researchers from one sector do not participate any longer
at meetings of other sectors); Blum,All The Best? 12NATLL.J. 2 (1990) (describing criticisms of Archibald

Cox's choices for a panel on asbestos health effects).
109. See, e.g., GSF - Research Center for Environment and Health, WWWINTERNET (copy on file with
The TransnationalLawyer).
110. The green strategy can help government regulators to comply with mandates of which they are the
subjects, such as under RCRA to develop an affirmative procurement program to purchase environmentally
friendly items. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991K (1995).
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The firm may even avoid the regulatory process through appropriate strategic
behavior. For example, a company may innovate in order to avoid an approval

process which is associated with a strict compliance standard, one which may not
be cost-effective from a societal point of view. Porter and van der Linde provide
the following example: faced with new regulations that would force many solvent
users in paper, plastic, and metal coatings to reduce their emissions ninetypercent by 1995, 3M found it beneficial "to go all the way and attempt to avoid

the use of solvents altogether and coat products with safer, water-based solutions.
Among the benefits were not only early mover advantages in product development over competitors (who will switch only in 1995) but also the reduced cost
of not having to go through the approval process for112
solvent-based coatings, thus

shortening the time to get new products to market."
The firm can take the lead in developing voluntary accords-again ahead of
the regulatory process. A voluntary accord is a contract (or more informally an
agreement) between government and the firm which establishes a set of activities,
not legally required, to reach a common objective. 13 Voluntary accords may

assist in the general relationship with the environmental regulator and avoid
command and control or other regulatory action perceived to be more costly. The

U.S.' Green Lights program is one example. Since its inception in 1991, the
program has formed close to 1000 corporate partnerships for the installation of

new lighting systems in 3.3 billion square feet of facility
space over a five year
1 14
period, perhaps obviating additional energy based rules?

111. Its detergent moved from fifth to second place in market share (from 6% to 9%) in only ten
months-without any additional expenditure on publicity. Hall & Ingersoll, Leading the Charge: Competitive
Advantage from Solution.Oriented Strategies, Strategic Environmental Associates, in THE GREENING OF
INDUSTRY, Boston, Massachusetts (1993). By 1970, Anheuser-Busch, one of the largest producers of beer in
the world, had distributed to all of its subsidiaries a publication on how to work together to address the problem
of solid waste. Lawrence W. Long, Anheuser-Busch's:A Pledgeand a Promise: Total Employee Involvement,
TOTAL QUALITY ENVTL. MGmT., Winter 1993. In 1990, a code was adopted and distributed to the firm's
dependents and subsidiaries; the company declared: "every choice which we make regarding the land, the air
and the water around us is done with the objective of preserving them for future generations:' Id Moreover,
the company specifically committed to: 1) reduce solid waste destined for waste sites by 40% in 1990; 2)
reduce the amount of water used for each barrel of beer by a specified percentage; and 3) reduce by 20%. by
the end of the decade, the amount of energy expended in production. Id. The objectives were defined with the
full support of management and encouraged by active participation of employees and family members of
employees. Id.Results were very positive, the volume of waste destined for waste dumps, for example,
dropped 37% in one of AnheuserBucsh's plants. Id.
112. Porter & van der Linde, supra note 2, at 19.
113. Lewis, supra note 97.
114. U.S. EPA Green Lights Program, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., GREEN
LIGTS UPDATE (July 1993). See Claussen, EPA's Green Programs,EPA J., Sept.-OcL 1992, at 20; see also
EPA, ENERGY STAR PRoGRAM (encouraging the creation of technology for catnapping computers and printers);
Fitzgerald, EPA PlantsSeedfor Green PC Project,COMUTER WORLD, June 1993. at 24.
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The firm can informally offer information to the regulatory agency, maintaining contact with agency employees and serving generally as a good citizen in

the regulatory environment. Information may be provided at professional
meetings, through e-mail interactions, correspondence, mailing lists--all the
usual channels used among colleagues. Communications may address new technologies, ideas about regulatory strategies, reports on work in other natiolts, and
costs associated with alternative regimes for achieving a given amount of
environmental protection. The latter contribution is not totally altruistic.115 As
Kagan succinctly summarizes: "Regulation is a political process."' 6 Controls on
the regulators themselves come from many sources, one of which is legislators'
concern about objectives of public policy other than environmental quality,
including international competitiveness;
so some policy makers may welcome
17
information about costs.

Whether formal or informal, negotiations may be important because the
pre-existing relationship with the regulator may produce results that are
counterproductive from the perspectives of both the firm and society. Porter and
van der Linde offer an example:

"Liability exposure and inflexibility in enforcement, among other things,
contribute to the problem. For example, a company that achieves ninetyfive percent of target emissions reduction via innovation while also
registering substantial offsetting cost reductions will be out of com-

pliance and face liability, while adopting a safe but expensive secondary
treatment approach is rewarded."' 18

115. F. Clifford, Strategy UnclearasAQMDDrops Anti-Smog Plan, L.A. TMES, Jan. 13, 1996, at Al.
A number of commentators have noted the widely discrepant costs associated with different regulatory
approaches for reaching a given environmental standard. Id. Some have found that strategies driven by rules
imposed by the agency are much more costly than those which leave the decision on how to achieve standards
to the company. Id. It should be noted, however, that considerable criticism is again mounting about strategies
which leave greater discretion with the firm; critics argue that the same standards in fact will not be achieved.
Id For example, under pollution trading regimes such as RECLAIM in Southern California (SCAQMD) "hot
spots" of air pollution may be created within a "bubble" whose overall standard is legally compliant. Id.
Not all observers view attempts by the firm to impress the regulatory agency by reference to its green
management strategie as good for public policy. As Lewis has noted:
Many corporations are citing their voluntary actions, however weak they may be, to argue against
new legislation and regulation. At the same time that Sun Corporation says it is a slave of markets,
its lobbyists will lobby against new legislation that might cut into those markets. Sun official
Grabowski noted that among the benefits to Sun from enforcing the principles, would be the added
credibility they gain from lobbying Congress on environmental legislation they find too costly.
Lewis, supra note 97, at 10.
116. Kagan, supranote 35, at 399.
117. "[R]egulators demanded less stringent emission limits for sulfur dioxide emissions from copper
smelters in the American southwest than from electrical power plants. Mhe smelters faced foreign competition
and would probably close if they faced high [pollution control] costs:' Kagan, supra note 35, at 398 (citing
Nichols).
118. See Porter & van der Linde, supranote 2, at 36.
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By informing the regulators of its special circumstances, the firm may help meet
the regulators' objectives and itself save considerable costs. A coordinated result
may even increase the probability of long term environmental improvements.
An extension of employing green management as a vehicle for negotiations
with regulatory agencies is for the firm to make the green strategy an organizing
principle for regulation, as has been suggested for Western Europe and Australia." 9 This idea is yet to be developed in the United States. It would involve
recognition by regulators of the benefits of management according to green
principles and it would seek regulations respectful of a private sector driven
choice of pollution control and environmental protection strategies.
In its interactions with the regulator, the firm can also make use of
"stakeholders" or supportgroups. These are groups, both in the larger environment2n° and within the firm itseWf, which monitor the environmental performance of the firm and are a constant actual or potential influence on regulatory
politics. Kagan has noted that "[t]he vigilance and capacity of potential complainants and advocacy organizations appear to be the most powerful influences
on regulatory agency enforcement style." ' 2 This dynamic extends as well to
regulatory orientation. Approaches to cultivating positive relations with these
groups are legion. In addition to those mentioned above (such as involving
environmentalists on company boards and subsidizing environmental group
activities), industry can: keep the groups consistently apprised of innovations
which are protective of environmental values; solicit advisory opinions from the
stakeholders on responses to existing and proposed laws; and seek out evaluations
of new product lines and general environmental policy.!3 In Canada, when
Loblaws was considering the introduction of two new product lines, it called on
the assistance of stakeholders. To define the requirements of the product lines
(G.R.E.E.N. and President's Choice), the company sought collaboration with
environmental groups including Greenpeace and Pollution Probe, which assisted
in defining product characteristics. This stakeholder network also helped Loblaws
in its efforts to fashion Canada's green labeling program. Proctor and Gamble
offers an interesting case in the United States. In 1984, the company initiated a
plan to address the solid waste problem associated with disposal of paper diapers.

119. SASSOON & SASSOON, supra note 1 (offering some idea of this overreaching suggestion). Less
comprehensive but similar notions are found in the work of the self regulating firm. See John Braithwaite,
EnforcedSelf-Regulation:A New Strategyfor CorporateCrimeControl 80 MiCH. L. REv. 1466 (1982).
120. SeeJosEPHF. DIMENrO, ENVjONmEtrALLAw AND AMEIRMANBusmNaSs (1986).

121. Kagan describes how support for green management and for strong public regulation of the
environment can come from within the firm, independent of top management: "[c]orporate environmental
engineers, safety experts, affirmative action officers, nurses, and auditors constitute a shadow regulatory
bureaucracy, often supportive of the regulatory regimes to which they owe their livelihood... "Kagan, supra
note 35 at 397.
122. Id. at 397,
123. See Carlson & Moulden, Green is Gold, HARPER Bus. (1991).
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In 1985 the firm introduced Pampers, a new type of diaper which is one half of
the breadth of the prior diaper. Later, in 1989, the firm introduced a system to
drastically reduce waste through composting which reduces the volume of
material destined for the disposal site by a full eighty percent. A test of the composting plan confirmed the validity of the idea behind the system. However, its
implementation was stymied. In all of the firm's marketing territories, only ten4
composting plants existed with another 150 in various phases of development.12
But the story did not end with failure of an aggressive green strategy. Rather, the
firm created a twenty million dollar fund to help local entities study the problem
of solid waste and undertake research on composting. While this courting of
stakeholders did not stop them from pushing regulators to adopt new taxes for
throw away diapers, it did head off additional requirements contrary to the firm's
economic interests.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: BEYOND FLOWERY CORPORATE
5
-HAPPYTALK12

Green Management favors environmental protection, favors openness in
sharing information within and outside the firm about environmental impacts and
innovations, seeks to involve environmental stakeholders in decision-making,
seeks to place the environmental perspective high on the organization chart, seeks
to outpace competitors in seeking environmentally benign processes and products,
and seeks to recognize strict compliance as a floor rather than a ceiling for a
company's environmental performance. In theory, green strategies possess
characteristics which may be used to promote better relations with regulators.
There are strong suggestions that the green approach can assist the firm in
realizing better treatment by government regulators and reducing exposure to
legal liability.
However, research on green management is embryonic and mainly case
specific. Thus, these strategies are not yet sufficiently analyzed to suggest with
confidence that they are, invariably, beneficial for the company or for the
environment. Results may not always be good for mother earth and for market
share and for model rule. They may favor one of these outcomes at the expense
of the others. Results may also depend on how the regulator evaluates the firm's
environmental commitment.l 6 They may be very sector specific in the short-to
mid-run, and may turn on continuities in platform and ideology across political

124. Proctor& Gamble, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, availablein PTS-MARS Database.
125. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Int'l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190 (1993). International Paper was
"chided by a U.S. district court judge for using 'flowery corporate happy-talk' to inaccurately portray its
environmental record to shareholders." Id.; see Rice. supranote 53, at 114.
126. Id.

1996/Green Managementand the Regulatory Process
administrations. Besides, better relations with government may be evolving
independent of firm strategy, the result of other societal forces.
The examples in this article and in the literature in general represent a
minuscule set of interactions between business and regulators. Many companies

in the environmental sector remain highly skeptical about greater interactions
with government. Small firms especially question entering accords with public
agencies, still viewing state and federal government as intruders into their

business policies. Others may be concerned that touting an environmental strategy
will only focus regulatory attention on the firn-that a failure to win over the
regulatory agency may result in being pulled deeper into the regulatory mode of

government environmental policy, including into the confusing world of governmental regulation of green advertising claims.'Or, more directly, effective green
management may simply promote more frequent and easier enforcement of
environmental law against the very firms trying to be good corporate citizens.ts
Furthermore, many of the suggestions reflected in green strategies take a mid- to
long-term perspective on benefits. A short-term orientation toward costs may be
quite understandable, particularly in periods of economic recession and par-

127. See Robert J. Gillespie, Pitfallsand Opportunitiesfor EnvironmentalMarketers, 13 J. OF Bus.
STRATEGY 14 (1992) (describing state and federal regulation of these claims and the National Association of
Attorneys General Green Reports I and II on efforts to develop national standards for environmental
advertising); Davis, Federaland State Regulationof EnvironmentalMarketing:A Manager'sGuide, 59 SAM
ADVANCED MGMT. L 36 (Summer 1994); see also Court UpholdsLaw Restricting 'Green' Labeling, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1994 (describing a U.S. Court of Appeals opinion upholding against constitutional challenges
California's law regulating green marketing claims). The law which makes it unlawful to represent products
as environmentally friendly unless they meet state standards. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508. 5 (West
1995), upheld in Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lundgren, No. 93-15644 (9th Cir. 1994) Daily
. D.A.R. 16436, Nov. 18, 1994. On the pitfalls of being too visibly green, see, e.g., Body Shop's Green Image
IsAttacked, N.Y. TIMS, Sept. 2, 1994 (describing the controversy surrounding an article in BusinessEthics
criticizing the purportedly socially concerned company's actual performance). "The dispute... may also prove
to be a cautionary tale for companies that project a righteous image ... regulatory authorities are pealing back
facades to see whether their operations justify their claims to 'green' or socially enlightened business
practices." Id. See also Parrish, supranote 92 (indicating that critics of GMs signing of the Ceres Principles
questioned the company's "motives" linking the action to GMs attempts to lobby against higher fuel efficiency
standards and zero emission vehicles). The concern with being overly boastful about a green strategy was
underscored in the McDonald's case. McDonald's, in a partnership with the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDI), created a model program of waste reduction. Among McDonald's commitments were to purchase
recycled materials for renovation and construction of new restaurants and to purchase millions of dollars of
recycled paper products. But McDonald's as a corporation has been loathe to advertise its environmental
strategy. An EDF representative explained why, in response to a question at a Senate hearing on green
purchasing practices:
DR. DENISON: I think part of it represents the moving target nature right now of the whole area
of environmental claims. It is unclear what can be said that is not going to be seen as either simply
marketing hype or deceptive:'
Buying 'Green': FederalPurchasingPracticesand the Environment,Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee
on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 50, Nov. 8, 1991.
128. Arlen, supranote 100 (auditing may produce information that must be reported to EPA "(t)hereby
subjecting (the firm) to increased risk of an enforcement action and possibly criminal prosecution" (citations
omitted)).

The TransnationalLawyer/Vol. 9

ticularly when viewed from the perspective of the firm, rather than the industry
in total or of an ambiguously defined societal good.
Despite all these caveats, the evidence is mounting that companies strongly
directed toward environmental protection will not only achieve results of benefit
to the natural environment but also will encounter an increasingly benign
regulatory environment. At the same time, convincing theory suggests these firms
should also see improvements in their economic indicators.
Evidence is also mounting that the firm which ignores the societal trend of
increased environmental concern transnationally may do so at its business peril.
Thus some lessons on strategy should be ever clearer to practitioners of law in the
international context and to business people whom they counsel. The regulatory
environment of business is rapidly changing and, with few exceptions, changes
are aimed at further pushes on business to protect the environment. Whether those
be in the form of stricter liability rules or inducement toward voluntary changes
such as through the ISO 14000 Standards, the intended outcome is the same: to
interject societal conclusions about good environmental management into the
firm's decision-making and practices. The advantages of this movement can be
considerable to the firm which keeps abreast of proposed influences and tries to
shape them toward its own perceptions of effective management, good public
policy, and profit promotion.
On the positive side, the vigilant firm will be able to influence the nature of
standards which will affect it, molding the rules of the game and also mitigating
the negative effects of violation of those rules. Through environmentally sophisticated counsel who work in the regulatory environment, the firm can limit its risk
exposure and protect itself from overly zealous, and perhaps not fully justified,
rules and policies. On the negative side, the firm that does not understand the
movement toward green management-at the national level and in the arena of
international organizations-may find itself faced with rules it does not understand and cannot follow, competition it had not anticipated, and difficult relationships with government.
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INTRODUCTION OF "GREEN" PRODUCTS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PRODUCTS INTRODUCED
BY COUNTRY

1986

1987

1988

1989

Canada

2.0

0.6

1.1

4.6

16.4

33.9

Australia

0.3

-

2.9

3.1

12.3

5.1

Europe*

0.7

0.9

0.7

2.4

5.7

3.2

Japan

0.2

0.7

1.6

1.8

1.5

0.8

United
Kingdom

0.9

2.4

4.0

8.3

10.8

7.2

South Africa

0.5

-

1.1

4.4

6.1

6.1

United States

1.1

2.0

2.8

4.5

11.4

13.4

* Denmark, France,

Germany, Italy

Source: Marketing Intelligence Service Ltd.,
Naples, NY, 1992

1990

1991

d

